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[I]n the 1920s and 1930s…Fascist theorists…adapting the language of Georges Sorel, 
grandiloquently proclaimed the superiority of their own creative myths as ‘dynamic 
realities,’ spontaneous utterances of authentic desires, over the utopias, which they 
dismissed as hollow rationalist constructs.1 
 - Frank and Fritzie Manuel 
 
We have created a myth, this myth is a belief, a noble enthusiasm; it does not need to be 
reality, it is a striving and a hope, belief and courage. Our myth is the nation, the great 
nation which we want to make into a concrete reality for ourselves.2 
- Benito Mussolini, October 1922; from speech given before the ‘March on 
Rome’ 
 
 One of the most historically recent and damaging blows to the reputation of 
utopianism came from its association with the totalitarian regimes of Hitler’s Third 
Reich and Mussolini’s Fascist party in World War II and the prewar era.  Being an 
apologist for utopianism, it seemed to some, was tantamount to being an apologist for 
Nazism and all of its concomitant horrors. The fantasy principle of utopia was viewed 
as irretrievably bound up with the irrationalism of modern dictatorship. While these 
conclusions are somewhat understandable given the broad strokes that definitions of 
utopia are typically painted with, I will show in this paper that the link between the 
mythos of fascism and the constructs of utopianism results from an unfortunate 
conflation at the theoretical level. The irrationalism of any mass ethos and the 
rationalism of the thoughtful utopian planner are, indeed, completely at odds with 
each other. I arrive at this conclusion via an analysis of the concepts of myth and 
narrative, and the relationships these have with the concept of utopia. 
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II: The Concept of Utopia 
 
 The best place to start is with the nebulous concept of utopia itself. A good 
deal of equivocation goes on in discussions of utopia due to its definition as ‘ideal’ in 
two senses: in the sense that it is (1) perfect and (thus) desirable; and (2) exists only as 
an idea. Often sense (1) of ideal is limited to cases wherein the object of desire is 
possible to attain, although this is not always the case.
3
 However, if ‘ideal’ in the first 
sense is constrained to the realm of the possible, then ‘ideal’ in the second sense is 
threatened if the highly desirable state is ever realized, as it would then no longer be 
just an idea, but a concrete reality as well. So there will be some tension between 
these two senses of ‘utopia’, unless we explicitly state that we are interested in only 
calling impossible highly desirable states ‘ideal’, which would be unsatisfactory for 
our purposes. Fine then: our provisional concept of utopia remains a conjunction of 
the two senses of the word ‘ideal’—a highly desirable state of affairs that only exists 
as an idea (at least for the moment); a social arrangement that is conceptually 
‘conceivable’ yet not contingently ‘achievable’, to employ a distinction of Peter 
Alexander’s.
4
 Problematic ambiguity should only arise for us in the case that utopia is 
thought to be realized—which is to say, if and when literally everyone can look 
around themselves at the current sociopolitical arrangements and honestly say to each 
other and themselves, “things could not get any better” (a state which could only, I 
suggest, result from a widespread failure of the imaginative faculty).
5
 The chances of 
that seem very slim indeed—although of course it is not logically impossible for such 
an occurrence to take place, utopia will probably not arrive in the time it takes to read 
this paper, nor before the advent of the next full moon, nor even in the lifetime of 
anyone reading this in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
 What is it that makes utopia so unlikely to obtain in the present and near 
future? First, depending on one’s theoretical preferences, either (i) utopia must be 
conceptualized as a possible state in the distant future in order for it to be 
meaningfully distinguishable from other, less ambitious programs of reform currently 
underway or pending; or (ii) utopia is defined as an extremely radical departure from 
the existing sociopolitical order, and thus (barring supernatural interference) the 
processes required to alter that socio-political order to fit demanding utopian 
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specifications will be predictably lengthy, placing it at a remote space-time coordinate 
(or, occasionally, completely outside the space-time continuum). Secondly, utopia is a 
genre of fiction, and it bears pointing out here that it’s not likely that a book would 
get shifted from the fiction section of the library to the non-fiction section, because, 
taking a second look at it, we discover that everything in it came true. Indeed, what 
could be less likely to occur than this? It is this second point that I want to explore 
today, as the first constitutes oft-trodden (and so muddier) conceptual ground. 
 The first thing that springs to our notice is the seeming importance of author 
intention—if an author intends to produce a piece of fiction, then it seems as if it 
cannot be considered non-fiction, even if her vision is eventually realized in all of its 
minute details. We might think of a work as being fixed in type at the point that it is 
written: a prophetic novel about a nuclear war occurring on December 17
th
, 2074, 
involving fictional characters who turn out to have real counterparts with identical 
names, occupations, and temperaments, and who initiate the same fateful series of 
events—such that the nuclear war arrives precisely on schedule—would, intuitively, 
remain classified as fiction (this would hold true even if the utopian author herself 
helped engineer this eventuality). The borderline case would be a book that began as 
fiction, but changed into non-fiction halfway through, or vice-versa. In either case, 
however, there should be some sort of discernable turning points whereby the learned 
or astute could distinguish which sections are the veritable and which the fictitious. 
Utopias do not constitute problematic borderline cases of the type discussed 
above. Perhaps this is because, as Alexander notes, that “[utopian] authors have been 
concerned with conceivability rather than achievability and with the clarification of 
familiar moral and political concepts. Few of them have discussed methods of getting 
from our present society to the ideal one.”
6
 Further, “[t]he conviction that we have 
described an ideal society does not confer upon us the responsibility of working to 
achieve that society as a whole, although it may confer the responsibility of at least 
not obstructing progress towards some features of it if they are practical 
possibilities.”
7
 In other words, the realization of the ideal is not necessarily within the 
strictly utopian purview—the utopian may well be neither prophet nor activist. Thus 
utopia would probably remain a fiction, stranded in the distant future (or, more 
classically, the distant past), if the politics of utopia were left to utopians.  
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Let us consider the converse of the utopigrapher’s predicament, for the sake 
of clarity. To wit: If an author intends to produce a piece of non-fiction, then 
correspondingly it seems as though it cannot be considered fiction, even if it 
corresponds to nothing real. The futurology of Marx fits into this category of non-
fiction. Futurology, of course, is the study of the future, the assembling of reasoned 
predictions about how things might be, given the way that things are. It is not 
intended as fiction, and indeed it can be taken as a science, qua Marx. Yet the future 
is notoriously opaque: for example, Marx’s predictions about the fall of capitalism 
have thus far failed to be realized, and so Marx now more resembles a ‘prophet’ 
(Popper’s epithet) or a mythmaker than a social scientist.
8
 Nevertheless, we will not 
find The Communist Manifesto amongst the books of fairy-tales in the children’s 
section of the library (and not for want of a happy, or at least dramatically satisfying, 
ending). 
But where do utopias (and failed social sciences) belong? Where is their 
proper place in relation to other works of literature? Alexander suggests that “among 
fictions, utopian writing is perhaps most closely related to fairy-tales than to other 
forms.”
9
 David Plath has, in a similar vein, observed that: 
Men everywhere seem addicted to visions of ideal otherness, although often enough it can 
only be achieved by death-and-transfiguration, or is the gift of infra-human mammals or 
supra-human spaceniks. So if one is willing to widen the definition to include other types 
of transcendent social vision, one can begin to see many varieties of utopian image-work 
in mankind’s many traditions.10 
 
These points are well intentioned, but lead to unnecessary obfuscation. I think that 
Plath, for example, is drawing our attention to the undeniable prevalence of myths in 
the history of humankind, and then attempting to link these mythologies thematically 
to the various articulations of utopia that have cropped up alongside and after them. 
But this conceptual brushwork is too hurried and imprecise; important distinctions are 
obscured by Plath’s proposed widening of the definition of ‘utopia’. Similarly, it is a 
tempting but ultimately misguided move to link the unknown with the known, the 
new with the old—and the utopia with the myth or the fairy-tale, as Alexander does. I 
believe the definition of utopia should not be widened or loosened in Alexander’s 
proposed fashion; that the myth and the fairy-tale constitute altogether distinct strands 
of literature. I stand with theorists such as J. C. Davis in upholding the importance of 
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distinguishing utopia from other fictional narratives and forms of ideal society. Davis, 
notably, identifies five unique types of ideal society typically encountered in political 
fiction: (1) Cockaygne, the land of unbounded desire and inexhaustible sources of 
satiation; (2) Arcadia, the land of moderate want and pastoral rest; (3) the Perfect 
Moral Commonwealth, a social arrangement with a common ethical system that is 
perfectly adhered to by each of its members; (4) the Millennium, a future time in 
which a supernatural transformation with positive effects on the human race and its 
institutions is hoped for or expected; and (5) Utopia.
11
 What makes Utopia distinctive 
on his account is that: 
Utopia, by contrast, accepts the distributional problems posed by the deficiency of 
resources and the moral disabilities of men. Unlike the others, therefore, it accepts the 
bases of the problem from which politics arises. Out of the minds and wills of human 
beings must come organizational forms and practices which will guarantee the just 
distribution of finite resources and contain the anti-social proclivities of men and 
women.12 
 
What Davis says here gels with the opinions of many other utopian theorists, and 
conforms as well to the contents of most utopian novels: human organizations and 
institutions are inevitably dealt with in utopias as an explicit or clearly implicit subject 
matter; the problem of the political is never far from the reader’s mind, and often one 
can detect blemishes on the visage of any ‘perfect’ state. The form and content of the 
fairy-tale, on the other hand, more closely approximates an Arcadia, a Cockaygne, or 
a Millenium than a Utopia. 
Nonetheless, where Plath and Alexander make important contributions in 
their discussions of utopia is in their recognition of its ultimately narrative character. 
The other tales of ideal societies are less logical and linear by comparison: the 
transformations they describe on humankind and the world are largely rationally 
unexplainable. The cash value of a Utopia, conversely, lies in the details of its rational 
explanation: usually through the exposition of an embedded utopian character, we as 
readers are shown the inner workings of a perfect society in motion. An attempt is 
thus made to convince the reader that the utopian system would operate in a fashion 
superior to our own, if only we cared enough to establish it in reality. Compare the 
function of narrative in a utopia to the function of narrative in a fairy-tale, for 
example, to see their divergent aspects. In a fairy-tale, the content of the story itself 
does not conform to the laws of nature or rational expectation—we would not, for 
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example, normally expect to stumble across a house constructed of gingerbread and 
inhabited by a witch on any of our walks through the forest—while in a utopia, the 
laws of nature are generally respected, along with the less believable elements of the 
story are mitigated by the setting’s spatiotemporal remoteness, and by our own 
underlying beliefs that the gap between a utopia and the society of today can be 
bridged by immanent technological and social developments. Therefore, the reader of 
the fairy-tale is not exhorted to any consequent course of action—they cannot expect 
their actions to produce a fairy-tale result, no matter how desirable it may seem; while 
the reader of a utopia may feel some consequent obligation or pressure to help bring 
about the better world that they believe might be possible someday. 
 
III: The Role of Narrative in Political Fiction 
 
The justification of hypothetical political institutions is part of the narrative 
of a utopian novel, but it also provides a narrative structure for an actual society itself, 
a positive end that is worth striving for. We can see the operations of utopia, 
therefore, as a story within a story within a story. I have written elsewhere on this 
point: 
Not only does the narrative form make the utopian ideal accessible to the public in a 
manner not possible via discussion of pure theory alone; but it also suggests a ‘meta-
narrative’, if you will, between the society that is and the society that could be. The reader, 
accordingly, is entreated to fill in the gaps between these disparate realities with their own 
thoughts, efforts, and real or figurative journeys.13 
Simply put, a story without an ending is unintelligible to us, especially when it is a 
story we are living through. The imagined end of the story provides the narrative 
framework we require to make our actions in the present intelligible to ourselves and 
others on a longer view. There must be a story that explains how who we are can 
eventually become what we ultimately want to be. This is not to say that we should 
obsess on death, that inevitable end to every mortal story; rather, I call our attention to 
the fact that we ought to keep in mind a clear picture of our ideal selves when 
considering the desirability of the range of actions available to us in the present. To 
fail to do so is to abnegate our future, at least as far as our power of self-determination 
is concerned. As Judith Shklar phrases it: “…in relinquishing utopia men lose the will 
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to shape history and so the ability to understand it.”
14
 Utopia is here seen as the 
theoretical key by which we are able to unlock a better common future for all. 
Without a means of visualizing an ultimate end to the ongoing collaborative 
venture that is the species-life of the human, we also lack the means to evaluate the 
value of our coordinated, as well as non-coordinated, actions in the present. Collective 
narrative writ large, a utopia is the end of a given society’s story, a state wherein the 
most predictable improvements upon current conditions—and many of the less 
obvious ones as well—have already been instituted, and thus further positive 
developments, though not impossible, would be difficult to clearly conceive of, and so 
articulate (utopia cannot be ‘one-upped’ easily). By providing a ‘happy ending’, a 
utopia has a motivational effect upon its readers; it gives its potential citizens a goal to 
work toward, a dream to chase. Krishan Kumar concurs that “Utopia’s value lies not 
in its relation to present practice but in its relation to a possible future. Its ‘practical’ 
use is to overstep the immediate reality to depict a condition whose clear desirability 
draws us on, like a magnet.”
15
 Without at least some narrative plausibility—a story 
(regardless of how shabby) about how to get to there from here—utopia would not 
have the power that it does to motivate political actions. This is, in part, because 
utopia is a suggestion regarding how things could be changed, how things could be 
different than they are under the existing political regime(s). Utopias thus lack 
authority outside the realm of the normative—they cannot punish, they can only 
advise, and offer rewards to draw us forward.
16
 
We can think, then, of utopia as both ethical recommendation and potential 
political reward in one. Presumably, stronger political rewards will tend to produce 
stronger political motivations and thus bolder political actions. In what can be taken 
as a further step in this line of thinking, Seiji Nuita asserts that “Utopia can be used as 
a barometer to measure the life-energy of a nation; if a race or a people lives 
vigorously in world history, it will produce utopias befitting its vigor.”
17
 In this rather 
ambiguous comment on the content of utopias, too, there is a wide margin for 
erroneously connecting the utopian tradition to history’s most notorious empires and 
xenophobic social movements. We can infer that there is a cyclical process described 
by this thought, wherein ‘vigorous’ peoples produce ‘vigorous’ utopias and then these 
utopias, in turn, further shape their peoples. While a corresponding relationship 
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between the production of utopias and the sociopolitical realities confronted by their 
authoring peoples is a very credible idea, it is just as likely that a truly ‘vigorous’ 
nation in Nuita’s sense would not need to be consoled or advised by a utopia; it could 
easily propel itself though world history on the strength of its national mythology. 
Vigor should not be mistaken for either a cause, or a symptom of, effective utopian 
theorizing. In fact, Nuita’s account in itself strikes one as mythological—the idea that 
a vigorous nation must produce vigorous utopias is not an empirical statement, nor an 
a priori truth (for instance, about narrative structure), but rather an article of faith. It 
is a step too far, a descent into hubris, to associate the rationality of the utopian with 
the actions typified by the politically frenetic; this is another basis upon which utopia 
is unnecessarily conflated with myth. 
 
IV: The Concept of Myth 
 
 At this juncture, when we begin to consider more carefully the distinction 
between utopia and myth, our theoretical worries begin in earnest: for what is a myth 
but a fiction, something that exists only as an idea? And we have to concede that 
myths share this sense of ‘ideal’ with utopias; but they differ in that other sense, in 
that they are not ‘perfect and desirable’. Indeed, myths are often employed to justify 
corrupt or otherwise odious regimes; they are ‘ideological’ in Karl Mannheim’s sense 
of the word. As the myth does not appeal to reason, we cannot bring ourselves to 
rationally prefer it to other states of affairs. Myth is preferred, where it is preferred, 
due to the appeal of its other features. Centered, as myth is, on phenomena, 
experience, and intuition, it caters to certain psychological, emotional, or spiritual 
needs and wants. Due, however, to their implausible narratives, myths lack rational 
persuasiveness—thus we must suspend our rationality to find myths plausible. This 
distinction is an important tool for disambiguating the utopian from the mythological. 
Myths are stories that provide non-rational theoretical frameworks through 
which one can non-reflexively interpret the world. They chiefly serve the role of we 
might call ‘explanatory fictions’. If a child in ancient Greece asked, “Why is there 
lightning in the sky tonight?” she might very well have been told by her parents that 
“Zeus is angry, so there is a storm” and this might have been the end of the 
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discussion, if the child was trusting. To use an example closer to home: my friend’s 
parents narrowly avoided a serious house fire, due to flooding caused by bursting 
water pipes in their basement. Her mother’s explanation of why nothing more serious 
occurred was simply that, in her words, “God must be looking out for us.” What is 
important to note here is that “God has it in for us” is an explanatory fiction that 
serves just as well to account for the phenomenon of the (nonetheless fire-preventing) 
flood in the basement as “God is looking out for me”, and “Zeus is happy” is an 
equally informative explanation for a storm as “Zeus is angry”. Although each 
statement is the inverse of another equally non-provable and non-disprovable 
statement, either could be accepted from a mythological standpoint without further 
evidence or discourse.
18
 The content of the myth, in other words, is secondary to its 
instrumental function in silencing further inquiry into a given matter, or in producing 
a desired pattern of acceptance in its audience. 
Plato’s ‘myth of the metals’ in the Republic is a good exemplar of the 
instrumental function of the myth. The republic’s hypothetical citizens are to be told 
that they are literally sprung from the earth and, as a result, they must protect both the 
earth itself (because it is their mother) and their fellow citizens (because they, being 
born of the earth as well, are all brothers and sisters).
19
 After swallowing these rather 
far-fetched premises, they are to be informed that “…God as he was fashioning you, 
put gold in those of you who are capable of ruling; hence they are deserving of most 
reverence. He put silver in the auxiliaries, and iron and copper in the farmers and the 
other craftsmen”
20
 and furthermore “change and meddling among those classes is 
death to the city”.
21
 All of this, of course, is not phrased as a rational argument, but is 
delivered as an indivisible set of unassailable assertions. It is presumably expected to 
be accepted as such, and a perfectly harmonious social order is the advertised 
probable result.
22
 It is blind faith, not reason, that serves to cement the social structure 
in Plato’s schema. 
In more historically recent times, in the realm of non-fiction, Hitler employed 
myth in a like manner, utilizing both ancient superstitions and contemporaneous 
trends in German ideology to produce the ‘myth of blood and soil’ with which he was 
able to rally the German people to his cause. Under Hitler, write Peter Calvocoressi 
and Guy Wint, “Germanism materialized as Reich and Volk, a pair of politically 
   
 294 
disruptive and often mystical concepts. A Reich is a claim to dominion; a Volk is a 
people linked not by habitat but by race. Reich and Volk combined imply racial 
domination.”
23
 Germanism, thus stated, is mythological because the concept of Reich 
expresses an illogical (arguably pathological, in this instance) will to power with no 
basis in rationality. To the skeptical minority in the early days of the ‘Third Reich’, 
belief in Hitler’s myth was coerced by the direct or indirect application of violence, 
with little or no attempt made at rational persuasion. The contrast with utopia here 
should be apparent in terms of function: again, the purpose of the myth to not merely 
to inspire, but to coerce if necessary. Due to its implausibility, the myth must be 
suggested and maintained from a position of political authority; whereas the utopia, 
because it posits a political counter-world, is always in the position of the subversive, 
and so it must appeal to reason—bereft of the aid of non-rational coercive power, it 
must phrase its seditious message in as plausible a manner as possible. 
Myths, in the oral tradition, demanded repetition in exactly the same form to 
all listeners. Intentional deviation from the repeated myth was considered a form of 
intellectual dishonesty, if one knew how the myth was meant to be retold; and 
questioning the myth itself was simply to admit that one did not understand the 
function of the myth in establishing or preserving sociopolitical apparatuses. Thus the 
myth is, traditionally, an inherently authoritarian narrative; it does typically not 
admit of revision or criticism, and it serves an instrumental function in producing 
behavioral compliance. The political myth offers a singular ending to a society’s 
story: there are no alternate possible endings vying for our rational apprehension and 
ranking. Rather, the myth presents a monolithic singularity that must be confronted, 
the idealized past and the idealized present and the idealized future unified in a 
relationship of mutual justification. The motivation the myth provides for its 
adherents is, principally, not reward-oriented but punitive—it aims not for innovation 
but for the prevention of the same—exactly the opposite of a utopia. 
According to Carl Schmitt, the myth is: 
 …not a rationalism that transforms itself through a radical exaggeration and fantasizes 
utopias, but finally a new evaluation of rational thought, a new belief in instinct and 
intuition that lays to rest every belief in discussion and would also reject the possibility 
that mankind could be made ready for discussion through an educational dictatorship.24 
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What are we to make of this ‘new belief in instinct and intuition’, and this rejection of 
a real or imagined ‘educational dictatorship’; this crisis arising from, and wholly 
opposed to, the dominance of rationalism? On a surface level, it looks as though there 
is value being read into reactive or unconscious actions. Surrender to intuition is 
praised, the animal instincts embraced. This seems ethically analogous to the exercise 
of automatic virtue on the state level, with exhibitions of phronesis by virtuous 
leaders and exhibitions of mimesis by their less virtuous followers.
25
 The analogy 
ends there, however, as the myth allows no room for real moral education to take 
place, as meaningful and probing discussion on the content of the myth is taboo. The 
myth offers up no syllogisms for our rational scrutiny, nor does it operate according to 
any laws of nature. For instance, according to the mythologies of different areas, 
islands can be created by gods dipping a spear into the ocean, or gods giving birth, or 
by gods throwing stones at animals; although each of these myths was considered 
authoritative in its proper time and place, neither reason nor the laws of nature can be 
called upon to help us assess any universal value they might have.
26
 Moreover, as 
Schmitt notes, the doctrine of political mythology denies the very possibility of a truly 
educable general public; from such a standpoint, the herd is to be led with strength 
and cunning, but never should attempts be made to reason with it, so such evaluations 
of myth are out of the question from the onset. 
In this manner the political myth resembles the political mysticism criticized 
by Adorno; characterized as it is by 
extreme empiricism, teaching absolute obedience of the mind to given data, ‘facts,’ 
[which] has no principle such as the idea of reason by which to distinguish the possible 
from the impossible, and thus the development of enlightenment overreaches itself and 
produces a mentality often no longer able to resist mythological temptations.27 
 
Rationality, deprived of its critical function in the context of political mysticism, is 
relegated to a bureaucratic role in the ceremonial authentication of irrational 
practices.
28
 When the possible is rationally indiscernible from the impossible, utopia 
and myth appear to be equally reasonable political alternatives, and indeed blur into 
each other, as one amongst many other unfortunate conflations resulting from the 
adoption of such a framework. We can imagine that within such a system, belief does 
not aspire to reflect objective truths, but simply gravitates toward what it is 
instrumentally useful to believe. Russell called this disposition “epistemological 
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pragmatism…the idea that truth is the same as usefulness” and associated it directly 
with authoritarian ideology.
29
 If whatever promotes or quickens pleasure, or prevents 
or delays pain, becomes rational, then no arguments can be formulated against the 
powerful. Compliance will maximize utility as long as the coercive power of the state 
is effectively pervasive. Under such conditions, Adorno notes, “‘[t]o be rational’ 
means not questioning irrational conditions, but to make the best of them from the 
viewpoint of one’s private interest.”
30
 The government of the continent-state of 
Oceana in George Orwell’s 1984 comes to mind, both for the mythology of constant 
warfare with the other two continental blocs that must be accepted by its general 
public to keep the state functioning, and for the main character Winston’s privately 
coerced concession to its representative that two and two equal five.
31
 The 
authoritarian myth penetrates completely in this story, from the various omni-visible 
apparatuses of state, to the innermost neural pathways of the individual human mind. 
 The myth, consolingly, offers the hope of some knowledge to its believers, 
although this sort of knowledge cannot be arrived at via independent reasoning or 
introspection. Even if whatever is known “ceases to be true when the Party ceases to 
assert it”, at least “[w]hatever the Party says is true, as long as the party says it.”
32
 
That being said, the central function of the myth is not to produce justified true 




It would seem that the myth provides all the motivational inducement of a 
utopian vision without any of utopia’s indictment of the real. Schmitt writes: 
Only in myth can the criterion be found for deciding whether one nation or a social group 
has a historical mission and has reached its historical moment. Out of the depths of a 
genuine life instinct, not out of reason or pragmatism, springs the great enthusiasm, the 
great moral decision and the great myth. In direct intuition the enthusiastic mass creates a 
mythical image that pushes its energy forward and gives it the strength for martyrdom as 
well as the courage to use force. Only in this way can a people or class become the engine 
of world history. Wherever this is lacking, no social and political power can remain 
standing…”33 
 
It is this embrace of enthusiasm, and the accompanying lack of critical function that 
ultimately distinguishes myth from utopia. Utopia, despite its ideality, ultimately 
arises from the need to rationally address concrete political and philosophical 
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problems. Conversely, Schmitt concedes that for mythmakers and myth-believers 
alike, “[e]very rationalist interpretation falsifies the immediacy of life. The myth is no 
utopia.”
34
 To iterate an earlier point: utopia cannot take root in a myth-based 
sociopolitical order because the vivifying and empowering myth does not admit of 
critique; demonstrations of power suffice to silence all arguments to the contrary. We 
are now conceptually closer to Alexander’s claim that 
most utopians have had as a central aim, though not their only aim, the solving of certain 
philosophical problems… thinking about utopias, whether favourable or critical, 
inescapably involves one in the analysis of certain moral and political concepts and that 
this often leads to the recommending of certain normative judgments.35 
 
Thus where analysis is impossible, a utopian vision is inconceivable. The political 
myth eschews philosophy, while utopia embraces and embodies it. Utopia and myth 
are divergent streams of political narrative that should, therefore, not be casually 
conflated—as they, unfortunately, have sometimes been. 
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